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MODELING NAVIGATOR ERRORS IN
COLLISIONS USING HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS
Deuk-Jin Park1, Jeong-Bin Yim2, and Chun-Ki Lee2
Key words: ship collision; navigator’s errors; slips, lapses and mistakes; Hidden Markov Model.

ABSTRACT
Understanding navigator errors can be used as a basis for
preventing collisions. Here, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
are applied to navigator errors of fishing and merchant ships
in collisions. Information on navigator errors providedin accident investigation reports issued by the Korean Maritime
Safety Tribunal is surveyed. The surveyed information is
converted into data using the framework of slips, lapses, and
mistakes proposed in this study. The results of framework
data states are inferred using the unsupervised learning of
HMMs, with sequences of navigator errors contained in the
error data. The expected errors learned using the navigator error models for fishing and merchant ships are compared and
analyzed. Results show that the proposed models can be used
to define the types of navigator errors and provide an understanding of these errors in a ship collision event. Several
interesting results are also discussed, including some ideas
on how to alter navigator errors.

I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding navigator errors when they are involved in a
ship collision is crucial for preventing collisions caused by human errors (Allianz, 2017; Montewka et al., 2011), which continue to be a major issue in shipping accidents (Chauvin et al.,
2013; Park et al., 2020). In this regard, Allianz (2018) addressed the following two points: (i) using and analyzing better
marine-accident data can appreciably improve safety and (ii)
an understanding of navigator errors and how they can cause
accidents is the missing link in the shipping industry today.
Navigator errors causing ship collisions occur during
bridgework (Lin et al., 2014). Bridgework includes all
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operations, such as the planning of navigational equipment,
which can be performed when maneuvering a ship (Park et al.,
2020). To classify these errors, Reason and Norman developed
a general classification of human errors, which were divided
into two categories (Reason, 1990). The error models of navigators who operate in complex, high-risk domains (e.g., ship
operation systems) are crucial because of high losses resulting
from navigator failures (Boussemart et al., 2009). Many techniques have been used to model various means of preventing
human errors (Davis, 1981; Inoue, 2000; Lin, 2006; Chin and
Debnath, 2009; Yim et al., 2018; Youn et al., 2019). While
partially observable models such as Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) have been shown to be a good fit, in general, for modeling unobservable states (Sathyanarayana et al., 2008; Jiang
et al., 2011; Phan et al., 2015), this study particularly focuses
on applying HMMs to ship-collision situations.
HMMs are primarily used to model and predict sequences
of symbols. In various ship-collision situations, HMMs can be
used to recognize and predict a navigator error for some levels
of intermittent interactions with various systems (e.g., navigational equipment or ship-control systems). However, the modeling of real-word processes using HMMs is difficult because
such models are parametric. Here, the challenge is that the
HMM inference algorithm requires a priori information on the
likelihoods of (i) specific observations and (ii) state changes.
Nevertheless, these parameters can be obtained from training
data in the model learning process. However, such investigation data cannot be directly applied to HMM learning. To
define observable error levels in ship-collision situations, this
study proposes a framework of human error classification slips,
lapses, and mistakes based on the slip–lapse–mistake–violation model of Reason (1990). Reason’s model (1990) involves
three types of errors associated with human performance,
namely, Skill-Based Slips (SBSs), Rule-Based Mistakes
(RBMs), and Knowledge-Based Mistakes (KBMs). Using the
proposed framework, recruited participants survey the navigator errors and manually categorize them into three levels. Then,
the categorized results are converted into discrete error data
suitable for HMM learning using discretization rules based on
the framework.
Herein, two types of navigator error models are implemented, one for fishing ships and another for merchant ships.
Further, the differences among these navigator errors are
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compared. Additionally, the results pertaining to navigator error transitions and the most likely decision-making pathways
are presented, and some interesting findings are discussed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the data and methodology, including the theory of
HMMs, navigator error data, and HMM learning strategies, are
described. In Section III, results pertaining to model interpretation and error pathways are presented and certain specific
findings are discussed. In Section IV, the findings of this study
are summarized.

II. METHODOLOGY
1. Data Curation
Data from collision accident investigation reports are collected and abstracted into collision events to determine the
performance of the navigator. Thereafter, the navigator error
framework is used to investigate and categorize the errors into
three levels. Then, the categorized results are transformed into
discrete error observation data suitable for HMM learning.
1) Navigator Error Framework
When ships collide, navigators make various decisions involving complex cognitive states. Several factors influence
the decision-making process of navigators, such as the ship
type, navigator’s expertise, navigational environment, and
collision-avoidance procedures. There is no technically elaborated simple approach for defining these decision-making
processes and errors of the navigator (Sanderson and Harwood,
1988; Dankelman et al., 2004). Thus, there is a need for set of
rules regarding how to define observable navigator errors in a
ship-collision situation. Accordingly, a navigator error framework is proposed herein to provide these grammatical rules
that define observable levels to describe navigator errors.
The navigator error framework is based on Reason’s error
classification model (Reason, 1990) and Embrey’s skill-, ruleand knowledge-based method for classifying human errors
(Embrey, 2005). Reason and Embrey classify and define the
modes of human errors according to their skill-, rule-, and
knowledge-based model as SBSs, RBMs, and KBMs. The
navigator error framework proposed here consists of three
categories, namely, given situations (Category 1), cognitive
processes (Category 2), and human failures (Category 3) at
the time of ship collision. These three categories are used to
describe a single navigator error as a series of decision-making
pathways.
Category 1 (situation) contains a level of familiarity with a
given situation at the time of the collision and is divided into
levels 1 (routine), 2 (familiar), and 3 (unfamiliar). Level 1 refers to errors controlled by patterns in the time–space domain
(e.g., if a navigator sails the same route every day). Level 2
refers to errors controlled by rules corresponding to a combination of subroutines (e.g., if a navigator avoids a ship collision in a narrow channel). Level 3 refers to errors in a situation
for which there is no experience or control rule from previous

Category 1
(situation)

Level 3
(unfamiliar)
Level 2
(unfamiliar)
Level 1
(routine)

Category 2 (procedures)
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
(mainly
(automated
(mainly
automated) and conscious) conscious)
Spatial domain
KBM
RBM
SBS

Category 3
(human failure)

Level 3
(knowledgebased)
Level 2
(rule-based)
Level 1
(skill-based)

Fig. 1. Spatial domain of observable navigator error.

situations (e.g., the sudden emergence of a ship that was not
observed as a result of bad weather).
Category 2 (procedures) contains a procedural level for a
given mission at the time of collision. It is divided into level
1 (mainly automated), level 2 (both automated and conscious),
and level 3 (mainly conscious). Level 1 refers to a smooth,
unconscious, control-free procedure that exhibits very close
coupling between the sensor input and response action (e.g., if
a navigator monitors radar collision alarms). Level 2 is a
mixed state of automation and conscious procedures and refers
to a procedure controlled by stored rules (e.g., if a navigator
monitors the radar collision alarm and then steers the ship according to navigation regulations). Level 3 refers to a procedure that requires planning using a conscious process and
stored knowledge (e.g., if a navigator steers the ship after suddenly encountering a collision situation between multiple
ships).
Lastly, Category 3 (human failures) identifies a level of navigator errors other than the intended ones. It is divided into
levels 1 (skill based), 2 (rule based), and 3 (knowledge based).
Level 1 refers to a mixture of slips and lapses, a slip being
when a person’s action differs from what was intended and a
lapse being an oversight (e.g., if a navigator changes the course
of the ship for collision avoidance but forgets conducting this
step). Level 2 refers to a case in which an action mismatches
the intended action because of misapplication or improper
planning of the rule, and the intended action is not performed
(e.g., if a collision is caused by the incorrect application of a
rule for collision avoidance). Level 3 refers to the failure in
achieving the intended output because of insufficient
knowledge (e.g., if a collision is caused by the application of a
false collision-avoidance regulation owing to navigator’s lack
of knowledge or insufficient knowledge).
Using this navigator error framework, the decision-making
of a navigator is represented by a total of 27 3
3
3 single pathways based on a combination of three categories with
three different levels. Using these 27 single pathways, three
types of observable errors are defined: SBSs, RBMs, and
KBMs. SBSs, RBMs, and KBMs correspond to levels 1, 2,
and 3, respectively, in Category 3 and any level of Categories
1 and 2. These definitions of SBSs, RBMs, and KBMs used
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Table 1. Rules for discretizing error levels.
C1

Number

C2

Number

C3

Number

L1

1

L1

1

L1

1

L2

2

L2

2

L2

2

L3

3

L3

3

L3

3

C 1, category 1; C 2, category 2; C 3, category 3; L 1, level 1; L 2,
level 2; L 3, level 3.

in this study are based on Category 3 in the navigator error
framework, with the intention of focusing on navigator mistakes. The three observable error types can be described as a
spatial domain as shown in Fig. 1, which contains the three
categories with three different levels. In the spatial domain,
the observable errors are represented by a probabilistic distribution of the 27 single pathways.
2) Experimental Data Collection and Abstraction
The experimental data were collected from a total of 2,934
collision investigation reports issued by the Korean Maritime
Safety Tribunal (KMST) from 2006 to 2018.
There are three principal methods for surveying human errors in a maritime context: (i) using actual ships (Chin and
Debnath, 2009; Yim et al., 2018), (ii) using ship simulators
(Lee et al., 2016; Youn et al., 2019; Park et al., 2020), and (iii)
using collision investigation reports (Grech et al., 2002; Celik
and Cebi, 2009; Ung, 2018). In the first method, data are collected from the actual environment; however, this approach is
very risky and expensive. The second method is safer than the
first method but does not obtain data from the actual environment. Compared to the first and second methods, the third
method requires time-consuming data processing and verification of data reliability and usability. However, despite these
requirements, this study employed the third method to survey
the error levels of navigators based on the following scientific
evidence.
First, the collision investigation reports were verified by
KMST (Yim, 2017). The reliability and usability of the investigation reports are supported by the following four key features. First, KMST is a government agency of the Ministry of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea and
confirms to the marine casualty investigation codes of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (IMO, 1997, 2008).
Its investigation results investigations are used as a legal basis
for determining the causes of accidents. Second, the investigation reports were issued by a group of subject experts comprising experienced navigators, legal experts, and professional
officials. Third, the investigation was based on verbal statements by navigators and comparisons of records of various
electronic navigational equipment (e.g., voyage data recorders,
electronic chart display and information systems, and automatic identification systems). Lastly, the reports detail the navigator errors chronologically in actual collision circumstances.
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Table 2. Discretized combination rules for observable
symbols (partial).
Symbol
Levels

1

2

…

9

…

18

…

27

C1

1

2

…

3

…

3

…

3

C2

1

1

…

3

…

3

…

3

C3

1

1

…

1

…

2

…

3

C 1, category 1; C 2, category 2; C 3, category 3.

Furthermore, these reports have been published since 1969,
with an average of approximately 300 reports being generated
each year. Anyone can download the reports free of charge
from the KMST website (KMST, 2020).
Based on these aspects, the reports were deemed to be suitable for this study. The report contents are summarized and
stored in an Excel file for surveying the error levels of navigators. The items and contents of abstraction are listed.
Item 1 (general): It includes the specifications of the fishing
and merchant ships (e.g., type, length, and tonnage) and the
qualifications of the navigators corresponding to each ship
type (e.g., occupation, title, and level of certification).
Item 2 (situation): It includes the weather conditions at the
time of the accident, traffic conditions of the route, and collision-encounter status of the ship. Based on Item 2, we can
survey the level corresponding to Category 1 (situation) of the
navigator error framework.
Item 3 (mission): It includes the navigators’ duties (e.g.,
monitoring, collision avoidance, and steering). Based on Item
3, we can survey the level corresponding to Category 2 (procedures) of the navigator error framework.
Item 4 (causes of collision): It contains international regulations related to ship collisions (e.g., the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(IMO, 1972)) and the causes of human error (e.g., incorrect
application of regulations, neglecting duties, and drowsiness).
Based on Item 4, we can survey the level corresponding to Category 3 (mistakes) of the navigator error framework.
The summarized accident investigation was used to produce
the error observation data described below.
3) Data Construction
For data construction, experts were recruited using the proposed framework to examine the level of grammatical errors.
In total, eight participants were selected (six men and two
women), each with a boarding career as an officer of 3–13
years (mean, 6.63 years; standard deviation, 3.04 years) and
ages of 31–60 years (mean, 41.0 years; standard deviation,
19.98 years). Such a wide range of participants was selected
to reduce personal biases to the maximal possible extent. The
participants were asked to learn how to conduct a survey using
the navigator error framework. The process of surveying the
performance levels is presented.
First, each participant read one summarized accident investigation at a time and determined the error levels corresponding

Journal of Marine Science and Technology, Vol. 28, No. 6 (2020)
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Table 3. Portion of error observation data (T = 2,858).
Error Level

Data
Number

Ship
Type

C1

C2

C3

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

2

14

3

2

3

3

3

27

…

…

…

…

…

…

t−2

2

1

2

2

13

t−1

1

2

3

3

26

T

1

2

1

2

11

Symbol

C 1, category 1; C 2, category 2; C 3, category 3.

to the three levels of each of the three categories of the navigator error framework. Next, a representative error level for
each Category was determined by a group discussion among
the participants. Lastly, three error levels corresponding to
each of the three categories were surveyed for one accident.
Table 1 shows the survey results presented as integers using
the rules for discretizing error levels. This process was repeated until all the surveys were completed.
Thereafter, the surveyed data were converted into discrete
error observation data using the observable symbols shown as
integers in Table 2. These observable symbols represent the
27 single pathways comprising the combinations of the three
levels of each of the three categories.
Table 3 shows a portion of the constructed error observation
data. The first column presents the observation numbers of the
surveys, the second presents the identification numbers of the
fishing and merchant ships, the third and fifth present the survey results, and the sixth column shows the error observations
represented by symbols. This process yielded a total of 2,858
sample data excluding the nonhuman error data from a total of
2,934 collision investigation reports.
2. HMMs
HMM consists of a stochastic Markov chain based on a set
of hidden states whose values cannot be directly observed.
Each hidden state generates an observable symbol according
to a specific emission function. Although the sequence of hidden states cannot be directly observed, the probability of being
in a specific state can be inferred from the sequence of observed symbols.
There are two types of learning: supervised and unsupervised. To guide the learning process, supervised learning
requires labels using which prior information on the data
are assigned; these labels typically consist of input data associated with the expected model output and are defined by
subject experts. However, it would be difficult to label the
training data in the present case because navigator error
states are not observable in ship-collision situations. Consequently, unsupervised learning is used here to extract the
optimal set of model parameters using only the information

contained in the training data.
In this approach, the initial values of the model parameters
λ=(A,B,π) are set, where λ is continuously updated and the expectation is computed to maximize P Ο|λ . Among all unsupervised learning algorithms, an iterative procedure known as
the Baum–Welch algorithm is widely used (Baum and Petrie,
1966; Baum, 1972; Devijver, 1985). This algorithm uses the
forward and backward variables 𝛼 𝑖 and βt+1 i , respectively, to estimate the model parameters 𝜆 to determine the updated values of πi , aij , and bj (k). For notation simplicity, we
introduce

t  i , j  

t  i  aij b j  ot 1   t 1  j 
P o  

 t  i    j 1 t  i , j 
N

(1)

(2)

for a given model λ and observation sequence 𝛰, where ξt i,j
is the probability of being in states Si and Sj at times t and t +
1, respectively, and  t  i  is the probability of being in state
Si at time t.
Using (1) and (2), we can re-estimate the model parameter
λ=(A,B,π). A set of reasonable re-estimation formulas for π, A,
and B are presented (Rabiner, 1989):

 i   1 (i )




T 1

aij 

  i, j 

t 1 t
T 1

T
bj (k ) 

(3)

(4)

 i 
t 1 t
t 1

 t i 

s .t . ot  vk
T
t 1 t



 i 

.

(5)

This updating procedure yields a new parameter λ=(A,B,π).
The final optimal value of the parameter is obtained by repeatedly using 𝜆̅ instead of λ and repeating the update estimate calculation.
The process described above assumes that the number of
hidden states is known in advance. However, this assumption
is unrealistic in most practical situations, and the structure of
the model must be determined using a process known as the
model selection.
2. HMM Learning Strategy
The HMMs described above can be used to model navigator
errors; however, there are three issues related to HMMs in their
nominal form.
The first issue concerns the meaning and number of hidden
states. A simple model with too few hidden states cannot model
the complexity of human errors (Rabiner and Juang, 1986;
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2.3417

Table 4. Length of data sequences used for training and
testing.

-3042.5

Log-likelihood

2.3416

Length of data sequence
Training

Testing

Sum

Fishing Ship

1,247

535

1,782

Merchant Ship

753

323

1,076

Sum

2,000

858

2,858

2.3415

-3043

-3043.5

2.3414
2-norm (×104 )

Model

635

-3044

2

4

10
15
Number of states

20

2

4

10
15
Number of states

20

2.3413
-1303.8

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1. Selecting a Model Size and Labeling the States
The model size was selected by evaluating the 2-norm of
the log-likelihood matrix of the training and test sequence sets.
The states were labeled by analyzing the distribution of the observed-symbol probabilities.

1) Selecting a Model Size
The model size was selected by evaluating the 2-norm of
the log-likelihood matrix of the training and test sequence sets.
The results of the 2-norm calculations of both the models are
presented in Figs. 2 and 3, wherein the 2-norm corresponding

2.3411

2.3410

2.3409

2

4

10
15
Number of states

-1304
-1304.2
-1304.4
-1304.6

20

Fig. 2. 2-norm (left) and average log-likelihoods of training data (upper
right) and test data (lower right) for the navigator error model of
a fishing ship.

-1883

1.4497

Log-likelihood

1.4497
1.4496

-1883.5

1.4495
2-norm (×104 )

-1884

1.4495
1.4494

2

5

10
15
Number of states

20

2

5

10
15
Number of states

20

-808.8

1.4494
Log-likelihood

Rabiner, 1989). To resolve this issue, this study uses 2-norm,
a scalar that provides some measure of the magnitude of the
elements of the matrices with log-likelihoods for the training
and test data (Bourbaki, 2013).
The second issue is the labeling of states, which allows easy
interpretation of the underlying structure of HMM from unsupervised learning. Because of the variety of navigator errors
in complex ship operations, no subject-matter expert was
available to label the data manually (Boussemart et al., 2009).
Therefore, in this study, the state labels were specified using
an observed-symbol probability distribution with information
regarding the navigator error levels.
Lastly, the third issue concerns parameter adjustment during HMM training. The HMM parameters provide indirect semantic information regarding the training data (Kam et al.,
2004), and the resulting model must be interpreted in a manner
that highlights the explanatory mechanisms. Herein, based on
the HMM notation, the error of a navigator involved in a collision accident was inferred using the performances of the directly observable error.
HMM learning of navigator error models the time sequence
of the error observation data. During this process, the HMM
parameters are trained using the sequences of unlabeled error
observation data. The initial HMM parameters are randomly
selected, and the HMM outputs the data sequence. In this experiment, the sequence data were divided into two groups, one
for training and another for testing. Out of the sequence data,
70% and 30% were used for training and testing, respectively.
Table 4 shows the length of data sequences used for modeling
the navigator errors of the fishing and merchant ships.

Log-likelihood

2.3412

1.4493
1.4493
1.4492

2

5

10
15
Number of states

20

-808.9

-809

-809.1

Fig. 3. 2-norm (left) and average log-likelih oods of training data (upper
right) and test data (lower right) for the navigator error model of
a merchant ship.

to the number of states increases from 2 to 20. In both the
figures, the left-hand graph shows the 2-norm and the two
graphs on the right illustrate the average log-likelihood of the
training and test sequences applied to the 2-norm calculation.
In this study, a logarithmic scale was used to avoid very small
numerical probability values. In Figs. 2 and 3, the solid lines
along the horizontal axis show the 2-norm and average loglikelihood values, which correspond to the number of states
determined from the analysis below.
In both the figures, the left-hand graphs show a drastic reduction in the 2-norm at a specific number of states, i.e., four
and five in the navigator error models of the fishing and
merchant ships, respectively. In particular, the 2-norm values below the solid line appear to be closer to the solid line
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0.4

State 0

0.3

State 1
State 2

0.2

State 3

Table 5. Results of labeling the states for the navigator error model of the fishing ship.
State

0.1
0
1

18

9

27

Probability

Symbol (number)

0.4

State 0

0.3

State 1
State 2

0.2

State 3
State 4

0.1
0
1

9

18

Weight (%) errors
SBS

RBM

KBM

Sum

State label

R47% + S45%
State
45.21
46.56
8.23
100.0
+ K8%
0
S50% + R31%
State
49.47
31.43
19.10
100.0
+ K19%
1
S45% + R37%
State
44.40
37.29
18.31
100.0
+ K18%
2
R61% +S21%+
State
21.32
60.84
17.84
100.0
K18%
3
SBS, skill-based slips; RBM, rule-based mistakes; KBM, knowledgebased mistakes.

27

Symbol (number)

Fig. 4. Observation-symbol probability of the navigator error models:
fishing-ship model (upper) and merchant-ship model (lower).

than are those above the solid line. Note that 2-norm indicates
the similarity between the training and testing results—the
smaller the 2-norm, the greater the similarity. Additionally, the
model must be as small as possible for easy interpretation of
the HMM structure.
Consequently, the model size was determined from the optimal fit, i.e., the models based on fishing and merchant ships
contain four and five states, respectively.
2) Labeling of States
The sizes of the symbol probabilities of the navigator error
models are shown in Fig. 4, in which the upper and lower
graphs represent the fishing and merchant ships, respectively.
The horizontal and vertical axes represent the number of 27
observable symbols and the symbol probability, respectively.
These observable symbols can be distinguished by the three
errors defined in the navigator error framework, i.e., SBS
(symbol numbers 1–9), RBM (symbol numbers 10–18), and
KBM (symbol numbers 19–27).
Fig. 4 shows that the symbols for the states have different
probability distributions for the three errors. Consequently,
each state can be specified using the distributions of the observed-symbol probabilities.
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of labeling the states for
the navigator error models using the symbol probability distributions for the fishing and merchant ships, respectively.
Each label consists of a combination of the first letter of
each error acronym and the weight of that error, the latter being
the percentage of the cumulative probability of the symbols
corresponding to that error. The ordering of the first letters
corresponds to the weights arranged from the largest to smallest. For instance, the label “R47% + S45% + K8%” shown for
state 0 in Table 4 has the following meaning: RBM has the
largest weight, followed by SBS, and then KBM, with 47%,
45%, and 8% weights, respectively. This labeling method an

Table 6. Results of labeling the states for the navigator error model of the merchant ship.
State

Weight (%) errors
SBS

RBM

KBM

Sum

State label

R50% + S33% +
State
32.77 50.38 16.85 100.0
K17%
0
S37% + R35% +
State
37.14 34.83 28.03 100.0
K28%
1
S39% + K33% +
State
38.71 27.70 33.59 100.0
R28%
2
R53% + K35% +
State
12.32 53.18 34.50 100.0
S12%
3
State
20.75 55.56 23.69 100.0 R55%+K24%+S21%
4
SBS, skill-based slips; RBM, rule-based mistakes; KBM, knowledgebased mistakes.

easy approach for model interpretation using the information
on the weights and ranking of the errors included in each state.
2. Navigator Error Transitions
The transitions among the hidden states of the navigator error models of the fishing and merchant ships are shown in Figs.
5 and 6, respectively. The annotated arrows between the states
indicate the transition probability of moving from one state to
another. The functions of the observation symbols are not expressed explicitly; however, the weighted errors associated
with the observation symbols are indicated in the label of the
hidden states.
For the navigator error model of the fishing ship in Fig. 5,
the notable feature is that the transition probabilities from
states 0 or 3 to states 1 or 2 are greater than those in the opposite directions. States 0 and 3 show the largest RBM weights,
while states 1 and 2 exhibit the largest SBS weights. Consequently, the errors of the fishing-ship navigators can be
expected to primarily transition from RBM to SBS.
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0.008

0.383
0.412

State 0
(R47% + S45% + K8%)

State 1
(S50% + R31% + K19%)

0.173
0.503

0.451

0.202

Table 7. Some optimal log-likelihoods of observed symbols for navigator’s error models of fishing and merchant
ships.
Ranking

0.097

0.195

Fishing Ship

0.315
0.347

0.078
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Merchant
Ship

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

Symbol

14

4

1

23

log(P)

−1.67

−1.73

−2.05

−2.31

Symbol

14

log(P)
−1.46
log(P), logarithm of probability.
0.112

0.235

State 3
(R61% + S21% + K18%)

State 2
(S45% + R37% + K18%)

0.019

0.472

Fig. 5. Error model of the fishing-ship navigators obtained using unsupervised learning.

0.371
State 0
(R50% + S33%
+ K17%)
0.150
0.157
0.119

0.092
0.220

State 4
(R55% + K24%
+ S21%)

0.173
0.141

0.288

0.018
0.251

0.008
0.211
State 1
(S37% + R35%
+ K28%)

0.320
0.106

0.262
0.230
State 3
(S53% + K35%
+ S12%)

0.187
0.243
0.346
0.203

0.201

0.227
0.295

State 2
(S39% + K33%
+ R28%)

0.179

Fig. 6. Error model of the merchant-ship navigators obtained using unsupervised learning.

Additionally, the transition probabilities between states 1
and 2 are larger than those between states 0 and 3. Consequently, the transitions in the error domain distributed in the
order of SBS–RBM–KBM are more likely to occur than those
distributed in the order of RBM–SBS–KBM.
For the navigator error model of the merchant ship in Fig.
6, the transition probabilities between states 4 and 2 are similar
at a significance level of 5% and those between states 3 and 1
are similar at a significance level of 5.6%. Furthermore, the
average value (24.6% of the time) of the transition probabilities between states 4 and 2 and that of the transition probabilities between states 3 and 1 (21.5% of the time) are similar at a
significance level of 5%. States 4 and 3 exhibit the largest
RBM weights, while states 1 and 2 exhibit the largest SBS
weights. Consequently, the errors of merchant-ship navigators
can be expected to continuously transition from RBM to SBS
and back.
Moreover, the transition probability from states 4 to 1 is
larger than that from states 3 to 2, while the transition probability from states 1 to 4 is smaller than that from states 2 to 3.

4

23

5

−2.01

−2.11

−2.46

Moreover, the KBM weight in the labels is ranked third and
second in states 1 and 2, respectively, while in states 4 and 3,
it is ranked second with different values of the KBM weights.
Consequently, the probability of transition in the merchantship navigator error depends on the KBM weight.
The following three interesting observations are obtained
from the above results.
First, the error of the fishing-ship navigators is predicted to
transition from RBM to SBS.
Second, the error of the merchant-ship navigators is predicted to continuously transition from RBM to SBS and back.
Finally, unlike the fishing-ship navigators, the KBM of the
merchant-ship navigators affects the transition between RBM
and SBS.
3. Decision-making Pathway of Navigator Error
The decision-making pathway of the navigator error was
determined by analyzing the optimal likelihood of the observed symbols in a single path of states.
Table 7 shows some of the optimal log-likelihoods for the
observed symbols of both models calculated using the Viterbi
algorithm (Viterbi, 1967; Forney, 1973). These results show
only the first to fourth highest values of the maximum loglikelihood among the 27 observation symbols.
In Table 7, for the two models, the combination of symbols
14, 4, and 1 or 23, which is common at the first to fourth positions, is analyzed as follows.
First, the log-likelihood of symbol 14 was ranked first in
both the models. According to the rules of symbol combination in Table 2, symbol 14 is combined with error level 2 of
Categories 1, 2, and 3. Using the level descriptions in the navigator error framework, these combinations can be described
as follows: the first-ranked decision-making pathway of navigator error of both the fishing and merchant ships appears to
be RBM in a familiar situation, primarily when performing the
mixed state of automation and conscious procedures.
Second, the log-likelihood of symbol 4 was ranked second
in both the models. According to the rules of symbol combination in Table 2, symbol 4 is combined with error level 1 of
Category 1, level 2 of Category 2, and level 1 of Category 3.
Using the level descriptions in the navigator error framework,
these combinations can be described as follows: the secondranked decision-making pathway of navigator error of both the
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fishing and merchant ship appears to be SBS in a routine
situation, primarily when performing the mixed state of automation and conscious procedures.
Finally, the log-likelihood of symbol 23 was ranked third or
fourth in both the models. According to the rules of symbol
combination in Table 2, symbol 23 is combined with error
level 2 of Category 1, level 1 of Category 2, and level 3 of
Category 3. Using the level descriptions in the navigator error
framework, these combinations can be described as follows:
the third- or fourth-ranked decision-making pathway of navigator error of both the fishing and merchant ships appears as
to be KBM in a familiar situation, primarily when performing
automated procedures.
In the above error path analysis, symbol 14 (corresponding
to RBM) is ranked first, symbol 4 (corresponding to SBS) is
ranked second, and symbol 23 (corresponding to KBM) is
ranked third or fourth. These results are consistent with the
interpretations of the error transitions in subsection 2 (navigation error transitions), thus indicating that SBS and RBM are
prominent and KBM is not prominent. Consequently, the interpretations of the error transitions were partially validated.
4. Discussion
To prevent ship collisions, it is important to reduce the
causes of navigator errors. In IMO (2016), various training
courses have been proposed to manage human error. Nevertheless, the ongoing occurrence of collision accidents shows
that additional measures are needed to reduce human errors
(Allianz, 2018). Smart shipping and unmanned ships are being
studied as alternatives to reduce human errors (Shaw and Tzu,
2019; Jung et al., 2018). However, it is also important to understand the characteristics of a navigator’s error, which is the
cause of marine accidents. From the results of the present
study, three interesting observations were made. First, the
fishing-ship navigators tended to primarily transition from
RBM to SBS. Second, the merchant-ship navigators tended to
transition from RBM to SBS and back, and KBM influences
were also included. Lastly, RBM was ranked first in the decision-making pathway of navigator errors. These results can
consider the working environment. A fishing-ship navigator is
more concerned with sailing than following navigation rule
when fishing. However, it is considered that the navigator of
a merchant ship sails along a designated route or course line.
Based on these results, a possible solution is changing how
navigator errors occur, i.e., RBM in the case of fishing-ship
navigators and both RBM and SBS in the case of merchantship navigators. However, to apply the above solution in the
real world, additional research using more elaborate techniques is required because many factors influence how navigator errors occur.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Herein, navigator errors of fishing and merchant ships in the
event of a collision accident were modeled using HMMs. The

results of implementing the models are presented.
First, both models predicted navigators would exhibit RBM
and SBS, primarily attributed to a ship collision.
Second, fishing-ship navigators tended to transition from
RBM to SBS, while merchant-ship navigators continuously
transitioned from RBM to SBS and back, wherein KBM influences were also included.
Finally, the most prominent decision-making pathway for
navigators was RBM, primarily in a familiar situation, when
performing the mixed state of automation and conscious procedure.
This study provided valuable insights into the modeling of
navigator errors in the event of ship collisions based on the
navigator error framework. Further, the resulting models are
expected to provide ideas regarding how to change navigator
errors to prevent collisions.
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